Statement on the results of the election on the single voting day on September 8, 2024

Table of Contents

Introduction

Characteristics of Past Elections

1. Record reduction of electoral competition
2. Targeted devaluation of elections in media and social networks
3. Coercion of voters
4. Obstruction of observation
5. Low level of security of election results

Introduction

On September 6-8, voting took place in 4,135 electoral districts (including by-elections for State Duma deputies in three districts, gubernatorial elections in 21 regions, elections of deputies to 13 regional parliaments, 20 city councils and two mayors of regional capitals). 

The Golos movement provided information on the course of the elections throughout the entire period of the election campaign, i.e. from May 31 to September 8. During this period, seven analytical reports were published, which focused on the legal peculiarities of the current elections, nomination and registration of candidates for the election of governors and other important state and local self-government bodies, campaign and administrative mobilization of voters, financing of political parties, prosecution of violations of electoral legislation, and the results of the elections held between the single voting days. During the voting days, from September 6 to 8, express reports were published and the "Chronicle of Voting" was published. The detailed information on which the statement is based can be found in the materials listed above.

The activities of Golos have all along been hampered by state pressure on the movement and the observers’ community as a whole. Grigory Melkonyants has been in pre-trial detention for 13 months, and on the first day of the election, Council member David Kankiya was declared a "foreign agent". In total, more than 20 Golos participants have been recognized as "foreign agents" at various times and deprived of the right to participate in election monitoring.

Golos received information from voters, observers, members of election commissions, media representatives, candidate headquarters, parties, and partner observer organizations through various channels, including the hotline 8 800 500-54-62, the Map of Violations, and the Internet.

The "Map of Violations" received 642 reports during the election campaign as of 9:30 Moscow time on September 9, including 394 on election days.

In its assessment of the elections, Golos is guided by the provisions of the current Russian Constitution and international electoral standards recognized by Russia, which stipulate that free elections are the supreme expression of the will of the people, are held in a competitive campaign, with equal opportunities for candidates, with free participation of voters, and that voting and counting procedures make it possible to determine with certainty the true will of the voters. Freedom of expression, association and assembly are also recognized as indispensable conditions for the free expression of the will of the electorate.

Characteristics of Past Elections

1.Record reduction of electoral competition

The political and legal system that has developed in Russia to date has led to the degradation of elections as an institution through which citizens participate in the governance of the state. The Electoral legislation is moving further and further away from constitutional principles. Due to the total restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens and the increasingly repressive nature of relations between the state and the individual, uncoordinated with the authorities and active participation in elections (in any capacity - from candidate to observer) requires courage on the part of the opposition, as it can not only put an end to all political ambitions, but also become a reason for political and physical persecution. This was clearly demonstrated during the election days of September 6-8. 

This targeted policy of intimidation is carried out by the government authorities both at the level of legislation and at the level of practice. 

Over the past year, federal electoral legislation has been amended again, primarily to arbitrarily restrict competition in elections. They are related to the disenfranchisement of people whom the state, often in an arbitrary manner, has included in the registers of "foreign agents", "extremists" and "terrorists", among them deputies, scientists, public figures, journalists and simply people active in the public sphere. First of all, they were deprived of their right to run for office. . In addition, they were banned from being proxies and authorized representatives of candidates and electoral associations, observers (the ban on membership in electoral commissions for "foreign agents" was established earlier). Thus, the authorities began to deprive citizens of their their right to run for office in an extrajudicial manner. And this was done just before the date of the elections or at the initial stage of the election campaign. And such a "deprived person" simply had no legal and procedural means to challenge this repressive status in time. 

Because of this legalized discrimination, as well as the practice of filing criminal cases against opposition representatives on various grounds, the elections on the single voting day in 2024 set an anti-record at almost all levels in terms of the number of those willing to participate in the elections. Under these repressive conditions, the systemic political parties began to behave even more cautiously, even coordinating significant nominations of candidates with the federal and/or regional administrations, refusing to engage in political struggle in those territories where the positions of the government representatives are not so strong.

If we compare the nomination rates of gubernatorial candidates in 2024 with 2019, when similar elections were held in most regions of the current gubernatorial campaigns, they decreased they have decreased by a third . In regional parliamentary elections, an average of 6.3 party lists per region were nominated, the lowest number since the introduction of party reform in 2012 (before that, the record was set in 2018, with an average of 8.7 nominated lists). In single-mandate constituencies, only 73 candidates were nominated by parties without preferential treatment, more than four times less than the number of mandates in regional parliaments. The situation with self-nominated candidates is not much better. Only 155 candidates were nominated - exactly half the number of mandates to be distributed.

In some places, the competition proved to be quite meager, especially at the level of local government elections (the authorities do their utmost to deprive local government of any meaningful influence on people's lives). In Salekhard, for example, the average level of competition in the districts was only two people per seat, in Anadyr - 2.5, and in Bratsk, in district No. 3, only one candidate made it to the ballot. Only three candidates were registered for the election of the head of the Altai Republic.

It is noteworthy that "parliamentary parties" were forced to skip many gubernatorial elections. The municipal filter remains an insurmountable barrier for those candidates who can pose a threat (not only electorally, but also in terms of media and reputation) to the administrative candidates. Opposition candidates must appear disproportionately weaker, less experienced, less charismatic, less popular, less rooted in the region than administrative candidates. As a result, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation lost five people at the registration stage, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party lost three, and New People simply did not nominate any candidates in 11 out of 21 regions. Yabloko did not register a single candidate.

Only at the level of local self-government do some elements of real political struggle remain, although even here competition is often limited in a completely artificial and arbitrary way. The municipal counter-reform, which is being implemented in many regions of the country and is aimed at the complete elimination of the settlement level of the Local Government, is destroying the very space for local politics and the very possibility for many citizens to participate in self-government.  

2. Targeted devaluation of elections in the media and social networks

The Constitutional Court of Russia in its time pointed out that the will of citizens can be freely expressed only in conditions when the right to objective information and freedom of expression are guaranteed. According to the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dated 16.06.2006 No. 7-P, when holding elections, the legislator is obliged to establish such a procedure of providing information, including election campaigns and their financing, which would properly guarantee the right of citizens to participate in the state government. 

Considering that most regional and local media are either directly owned by the state or highly dependent on it, it is not difficult to accomplish this task - if only there is political will. However, this will is directed in the opposite direction: authorities and local self-government bodies, editorial offices under their control, and social networking sites are doing everything possible to ensure that elections are perceived by voters not as a way of publicly discussing problems and electing their representatives to these very bodies, but as just a fun procedure with online voting, lotteries, figures and pies at polling stations. Candidates, their programs and electoral activities were practically not reflected in the public field, they practically did not exist for the voters.  

Campaigning and information were extremely stingy this year - the bet was clearly on "drying up" independent voter turnout and administrative drive. The media often formally refused to place candidates' and parties' campaign materials, despite the loss of potential revenue from paid advertising. As a result, candidates and parties were unable to communicate their programs and ideas through the media. Instead, readers and viewers of traditional media received a large amount of information about the daily activities of "administrative" candidates. In essence, the media ceased to fulfill their social function, for which society had granted them several privileges, and voters did not receive sufficient information about the ongoing elections and the candidates running in them. 

The situation in social networks was similar. In fact, the space of social networks during the elections turned out to be monopolized by the administrations almost as much as the space of traditional media. 

Traditional campaigning (outdoor advertising, distribution of leaflets and newspapers, picketing, etc.) was a bit more difficult to control, but possible. Various methods were used: illegal campaigning in state and municipal buildings and premises, obstructing the campaigns of other candidates and parties, damaging and stealing campaign materials, and simply exerting coercive pressure on candidates, their relatives, and headquarters staff.

3. Coercion of voters

Free elections imply that voters are free to decide without any pressure, but in reality the situation is quite different. 

Evidence of voter coercion emerged both on election days and in the period leading up to them. There were reports from several regions that supervisors forced voters to report turnout using geolocation to confirm they had arrived at polling stations, in some places QR codes were used, and in other calendars and flyers were handed out the old-fashioned way to report to supervisors. 

Remote Electronic Voting (REV) is being heavily pushed by election organizers. Although the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) likes to talk about the convenience and advantages of REV, the real beneficiary is the bureaucratic machine, which has been given another mechanism to control turnout and voting.  

The Moscow authorities are active leaders of this technology of voter mobilization. This time, with the help of the CEC of Russia and the Election Commission of the City of Moscow, they decided not only to increase the pressure on the dependent voters and transfer all of them exclusively to the REV, but also to create various obstacles for those voters who are either not included in the administrative and electoral grid, and there are enough of them in Moscow, or who consciously, due to personal convictions or at the urging of opposition candidates and parties, intend to resort to paper voting. Therefore, for the first time in REV-2024 we are dealing not with the stimulation of voters to a certain way of voting on the part of the electoral system (as was the case, for example, with the "mobile voter" mechanism), but with the actual direct obstruction of the realization of the active electoral right of Muscovites through the traditional and legal paper ballot.

The very process of requesting a paper ballot (i.e., refusing to vote electronically) caused many complaints from voters because it was too complicated. As a result, conflicts broke out at polling stations throughout the voting days in Moscow, and while on the first day of voting the election commissions were still accommodating people's desire to vote by paper ballot, on Saturday they began to resist. There were numerous reports of election commissions refusing to allow citizens to receive paper ballots; it is worth mentioning in particular the appearance of similar notices signed by PEC chairmen in precinct commissions in various districts of Moscow, which were handed to active commission members and observers. These notices threatened the respective commission members and observers with removal from the polling station and prosecution under Article 5.69 of the Code of Administrative Violations and Article 141 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (there are certified copies of such notices) in case they "try to induce" a voter to choose one or another form of voting in the polling station. The system of election commissions has decided to treat such actions as violations of the constitutional rights of citizens and coercion to vote in a certain way, which looks especially strange in view of the deliberate coercion of voters to electronic voting arranged by the Moscow authorities and the system of election commissions, as well as the inducement of voters to vote via TAG by the chairmen of the commissions.

We can talk about deliberate discrimination of those voters who, for some reason, do not want to vote electronically, but prefer the usual paper voting.

In general, the administrative mobilization of voters in the elections on the single voting day in 2024 is significantly inferior in its scale and organizational efforts to the presidential elections of this year. In terms of pressure on voters, the gubernatorial elections are the most serious.

4. Obstruction of observation

The Constitutional Court of Russia has pointed out that the right of citizens to participate in the governance of the state is not exhausted by ensuring free participation in the elections themselves. The Court notes that the interests of citizens and the state are not identical and may conflict. At the same time, citizens are associated participants in the sovereignty of the people, and it is therefore necessary to recognize their right to control. In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, a citizen may not be denied the right to exercise control over the procedures of counting votes and determining the results of the election in any form, including judicial, provided for by the law, as well as the possibility of a legitimate response to the violations found (CC Decision No. 8-P of 22.04.2013). Thus, the Constitutional Court of Russia points out the inalienability of the right of citizens to exercise control over the observance of the procedures of expression of the will. Such representation is intended to ensure the legitimacy of the decisions taken during the voting in the eyes of both supporters and opponents. The state is obliged to create the most convenient conditions for monitoring.

However, the federal legislature and the system of election commissions have been fighting against election observation for years to free themselves from public control. 

We have already mentioned above both the amendments to the law that excluded "foreign agents" from this right and the harassment of observers. Another legislative norm that seriously complicated the observation of election days was an amendment to the legislation, according to which the form of the list of observers is now determined by each commission organizing elections independently. This means that different regions have different rules for paperwork. Firstly, the amount of data on observers submitted to the commission has increased. Second, the form of the document and the way it is presented are now regulated by local norms - even the font to be used when filling out the form electronically. For example, it is already known that in Moscow the Times New Roman font is mandatory, while in the Sverdlovsk Region commissions require the use of the Liberation Serif font. 

Another change in the legal norms gave election commissions the right and opportunity to reject observer lists submitted by candidates and parties not affiliated with the authorities, which they did not fail to use. During the voting days, there were reports from various regions that election commissions refused to accept observers on formal grounds, and sometimes simply prevented them from submitting documents for their appointment. In some cases, higher-level election commissions simply failed to send lists of observers to district commissions. Excessive requirements for registering observers at polling stations led to the disruption of party observation campaigns in entire regions. However, the matter did not stop there. 

Observers faced undue restrictions in their work on election days: they were not allowed to familiarize themselves with voter lists, were refused to take them on mobile voting, were restricted in their movements and ability to take photos and videos at polling stations, were not given copies of laws and protocols, refused to accept complaints and respond to them in a timely manner, and exerted coercive pressure, including with the involvement of law enforcement agencies.

It should be noted that in some cases the position of the Central Election Commission, which issued an instruction on the eve of the election days, according to which it was allowed to prohibit photography and videotaping at polling stations in the regions bordering Ukraine, also played a negative role. 

Elections are a public process that benefits from maximum publicity and transparency. Transparency is one of the key principles of the work of election commissions, which is enshrined in the legislation. If the organizers of elections are so insecure about the security of voting that they consider even photography a threat, then there is no need to hold such elections, especially since there is a legal mechanism for postponing them. 

Incidentally, the initiative to create publicly available video broadcasts from polling stations was originally intended to increase publicity so that anyone could make sure that the vote was fair from the comfort of their own home. As a result, this positive norm eventually degenerated: now only the commissions themselves (whose work should have been judged by ordinary voters), the candidates (to a very limited extent), and visitors to special public observation centers, which in practice turned out to be not always accessible, can watch the broadcasts. And in the border regions, the right to video surveillance was again decided by the candidates themselves.

It should be emphasized that the members of the election commissions feel their impunity and more and more often begin to behave completely outrageously towards observers, candidates and even their own colleagues in the commission. Police officers, who are not so much called to maintain order as to suppress any violation of the law, rights and freedoms of citizens, do not react in any way to obvious violations by commission members and outsiders.

A video from Precinct Electoral Commission  (PEC) 142 in St. Petersburg, where the chairman of the commission invites observers to write complaints, after he decided to leave alone for "home" voting, with the words: "Write, we won't get anything anyway", can be seen as a symbol of the current election days. And in Kazan, at PEC No. 250, with the full opposition of the commission members and law enforcement agencies, 15 "volunteer" military men threatened and psychologically pressured a commission member out of the voting room. 

5. Low level of security of election results

Mass electoral fraud is a long-standing problem that the current system of electoral commissions does not even try to solve, but rather resists public attempts to change the situation for the better. Otherwise, there would not have been all the above-mentioned initiatives to limit observation opportunities, to create and spread poorly verifiable forms of voting - Remote Electronic Voting, multi-day voting, "backyard" voting, allowing early voting in border regions, etc.

Unfortunately, this time too, there were reports of possible falsifications. Many of them came from St. Petersburg and the Moscow region. However, with the help of simple statistical analysis, clear signs of falsification can be detected in many regions, especially those with higher turnout (for example, in Kuzbass or Bashkortostan). 

Traditionally, multi-day voting provides great opportunities for fraudulent results - after the first night, when the ballots already used by voters remained in the polling stations, doubts about their security began to appear (safe bags were damaged or not packed at all, the evening and morning numbers of ballots did not match, etc.).

Once again, the Remote Electronic Voting (REV) deserves special mention. For example, on the first day of voting in Moscow, electronic voting observers noted two cases of abnormal turnout, substitution of real votes with data from the test day, and a 1.5-hour delay in receiving data. 

Many reports were related to violations of procedures during outdoor voting (so-called "home voting"). The commissions refused to allow observers and candidates to familiarize themselves with the relevant registers and acts, refused to make the marks in the voter lists as required by law, did not inform observers in time about their departure for home voting, refused to take observers with them, etc. But the most important thing is the suspicion of direct imitation and falsification of mobile voting of voters, when the commissions allegedly received hundreds of applications in a very short time and had time to go around hundreds of voters.